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ABSTRACT
This note is concerned with the relationship between the secondary-market price of 
sovereign debts and the possibility of repudiation and retaliation. Using the distinction 
between "good" and "bad" states of world, the debtor countries optimal repudiation rate 
as well as the creditor's optimal retaliation and reservation price for any repudiation rate 
are analyzed under the assumption that the debtor and creditor are risk averse and 
expected-utility maximizers. Matching both debtor and creditor's considerations, the 
paper presents and discusses the properties of the equilibrium repudiation and retaliation 
rates and the secondary market price of a sovereign debt.
1 . INTRODUCTION
During the 1970's and the 1980's the aggregate indebtedness of the developing 
countries grew very rapidly leading to a heightened concern about their ability to repay 
their debts. Policy measures that were adopted to alleviate the debt crisis, such as cuts 
in subsidies and wages, raised instead the income inequality and poverty levels in many 
of the developing countires. Furthermore, the large external debts tended to adversely 
affect the developing countries' growth prospects. In this respect Krugman (1989) and 
Sachs (1988, 1989) argue that high governmental debt-service payments require high tax 
rates that discourage capital formation and repatriation of flight capital. Similarly, 
Dombusch (1988) argues that the fact that the government is the main maker of debt- 
service payments in most of the heavily indebted countries moderates the improving effect 
of devaluation on the trade balance.
These income-depressing effects of the external debt raise the probability of 
default when an adverse shock arrives. Moreover, country's external debt is a sovereign 
debt; and hence, when the potential penalties are insufficient, a rise in the country's level 
of indebtedness increases its incentive to repudiate (Kenen, 1990). Repudiation, in turn, 
might lead to a retaliation which takes the form of a seizure of the debtor country's 
reserves and other assets abroad.
A mechanism that may relieve the developing countries' debt burden and increase 
the expected debt repayments is the secondary market for sovereign debt. In this market, 
the debtor country can buy back its debt at a large discount, reflecting the creditors' belief 
that the debtor country will not meet its obligations fully. In this respect, Berg and Sachs 
(1988), who fitted a tobit model to developing countries' debt discounts, concluded that 
higher income inequality leads to a greater discount, while higher outward orientation, 
agricultural share, and GNP per capita squared tend to decrease the secondary market 
discount.
The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical explanation to the relationship 
between the secondary market price of sovereign debt and the possibility of repudiation 
and retaliation under the assumption that both creditor and debtor have an aversion toward 
risk and maximize expected utility. The analysis assumes that the creditor's retaliation is
limited to seizing the debtor's assets abroad and restrained from escalating into a trade 
warfare. It is assumed further that the debtor country is relatively small. In this case, 
the creditor and debtor should not be viewed as being engaged in an implicit contract 
such as a reputation contract:
"A good reputation for repaying foreign loans does not enhance a small country’s ability 
to borrow abroad. As long as the country faces competitive foreign investors, then any 
service provided by the current lender can equally well be provided by a new investor." 
(Bulow and Rogoff, 1989, p .47.).
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 analyzes the debtor country's optimal 
repudiation rate. Section 3 inquires the creditor's optimal retaliation and presents the 
creditor's reservation price for any rate of repudiation. Section 4 matches the creditor's 
considerations with those of the debtor country, and presents the equilibrium repudiation 
and seizure rates, and the secondary market price of sovereign debt.
2. DEBTOR COUNTRY'S OPTIMAL REPUDIATION RATE
The formulation of the debtor country's behavior is based on the common 
distinction between "good" and "bad" states of world (Cf. Krugman, 1988). It is 
assumed that in a "good" state of world the debtor country enjoys relatively high revenues 
and is able to repay its loan; whereas in a "bad" state of the world the debtor country's 
revenues are moderate and consequently it repudiates part of the debt.
The debtor country's decision problem is postulated as setting the repudiation rate 
to maximize expected utility from the returns on domestic assets and asset holdings 
abroad, taking into account, on the one hand, that loan repayments reduce the 
consumption and investment budget; but on the other hand, that in the case of a default, 
creditors retaliate by seizing part of the asset holdings abroad. It is also assumed that 
creditors provide signals about the potential retaliation to any level of repudiation; and that 
these signals enable the debtor country to accurately assess the seizure rate function s(r). 
For simplicity sake, the rates of return on domestic and foreign assets are assumed to be 
identical.
In this setting the distribution of the debtor country's consumption and 
investment budget, x, is given by
f(K  + A)v - D 1 . p
x = (1)
UK + (1 - s(r))A ]Sv - (1 - r)D P
where,
D = the debtor country's external debt;
A = the debtor country's assets abroad;
K = the debtor country's domestic assets;
p = the probability of a "good"' state of world;
v = the return per unit of asset under a "good" state of world;
1-p = the probability of a "bad" state of world;
5 = the ratio of the debtor country’s revenues under a bad state of world to 
those obtainable under a good state of world (0 < 8 < 1); 
r = the debtor country's repudiation rate when a bad state of world is 
realized; and
s(r) = the seizure rate function, i.e., the share of the debtor's assets holding
abroad seized by the creditor in retaliation to any given rate of repudiation.
The distribution of x displayed above implies that the mean and variance of the 
debtor country's consumption and investment budget are
E(X) = [(K + A)v - D] (1 - p) + {[K + (1 - s (r)) A] 5v - (1 - r) D}p (2)
var(x) = E(x2) - (E(x))2
= (1-p)  [(K + A)v - D]2 + p{[K + (1 - s (r)) A] Sv - (1 - r) D}2 
+ {[K + A)v - D] (1-p)  + {(K + (1 - s (r)) A) 8v - (1 - r)D]p}2. (3)
It is assumed for tractability that the debtor country has an expected utility 
function of the following flexible form:
E[u (X) ] = E(X) - 0.5Rd var(X) (4)
This form can be viewed as a second-order Taylor's approximation of the general 
expected utility function, indicating that the debtor country's utility from the expected 
consumption and investment is reduced by the costs of risk bearing stemming from the 
uncertainty about the state of world and revenues' level. The costs of risk bearing are 
considered to be proportional to the variance of the consumption and investment budget, 
and are amplified by the debtor's degree of absolute risk aversion, Rd. (See Freund, 
1956, for a rigorous development of the mean-variance expected utility function, and 
Hammond, 1974, for a discussion of the generality of this framework.)
By substituting 2 and 3 into 4, the debtor country's decision problem can be 
rendered as
The Khun-Tucker conditions for maximum expected utility from repudiation are:
Maximizing {(K + A) v - D] (1 - p) + {[K + (1 -s (r)) A] 5v - (1 - r) D}p
-0.5R<i {(1 - p) [(K + A) v - D]2 + p{[K + (1 - s(r))A] 5v - (1 - r) D}2 
+ {[(K + A) v - D](l - p) + {(K + (1 - s (r)) A) 5v - (1 - r) D]p}2}. 
with respect to r and subject to the repudiation constraint
r < 1. (5)
p[D - s' (r) 5vA]{l - Rd [(K + (1 - s (r))A] 5v - (1 - r)D] (1 + p) 
■ Rd [(K + A)v - D](l - p)} - |i < 0 (6a)
r{p [D - s' (r) 8vA] {1 - Rd [(K + (1 - s(r))A] 8v - (1 - r)D] (1 + p) 
• Rd [(K + A) v - D] (1 - p)} - (J.} = 0 (6b)
r < 1 (6c)
H > 0 (6d)
where (I is the Lagrange multiplier representing the shadow price of the repudiation 
constraint.
It is assumed throughout the rest of the paper that in a "bad" state of world the 
debtor country refrains from practising a complete repudiation and that it is worthy for the 
country to repay at least part of it loans (i.e., |1 = 0 and hence r < 1). This is the case 
where the debtor country's assets holding abroad are sizable and/or the returns on these 
assets are sufficiently large, and the penalty is perceived to significantly increase with the 
repudiation rate. Under this assumption there is an interior solution to the debtor 
country's decision problem - - the optimal repudiation rate from the debtor country’s 
perspectives should obey the following equality:
1 - Rd {[(K + (1 - s (r))A] 8v - (1 - r)D](l + p) - [(K + A) v - D](l - p)} = 0. (7)
That is, a change in the costs of risk-bearing from an infinitesimal increase in the 
repudiation rate should be offset by the change in the expected consumption and 
investment budget.
3 . CREDITOR'S OPTIMAL SEIZURE RATE AND SECONDARY 
MARKET RESERVATION PRICE
Using the aforementioned distinction between "good" and "bad" states of world; 
in which the debtor country fully repays its loans or partially repays its loan, respectively; 
the returns for the creditor, y, are distributed as follows:
It is assumed that the creditor's preferences over these random returns can be represented 
by the mean-variance expected utility function:
where Rc denotes the creditor's degree of absolute risk aversion.
Given that the creditor's subjective distribution of returns is as displayed by 
Eq. 8, the mean and variance of y are:
1 - p
(8)
P
E[u (y)] = E(y) - 0.5Rc var (y) (9)
E(y) = (1 - rp) D + psA ( 10)
var(y) = (1 - p)D2 + p[(l - r) D + sA]2 - [(1 - rp)D + psA]2
= p (1 - p) [r2 D2 - 2rsAD + s2A2]. (11)
The substitution of Eq. 10 and Eq. 11 into Eq. 9 implies that the creditor's expected 
utility from the returns on the developing country's debt can be rendered as:
E[u (y)] = (1 - rp)D + psA - 0.5Rc p (1 - p) [r2D2 - 2rsAD + s2A2]. (12)
Obviously, it is the creditor’s interest to maximize this expression by an appropriate 
choice of the seizure rate, s, that will be applied once the debtor country defaults. This 
choice is made subject to the collateral constraint that s < 1.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximum constrained-expected utility from debt 
repayment and seizure of the debtor country’s foreign assets are
pA + Rc p(l - p) (rAD - sA2) - T < 0 (13a)
s[pA + Rc p(l - p) (rAD - sA2) - T] = 0 (13b)
s < 0 (13c)
r > 0 (13d)
where T is the Lagrange multiplier. These conditions imply that in the case of repudiation 
(r > 0), the optimal seizure rate is given by
s *  _  «
[(1 - p)Rc A] '1 + (D/A)r if  T = 0
(14)
i if  r > o
The above solution to the creditor's decision problem indicates that if the 
collateral constraint was not binding (i.e., A is relatively large in comparison to D and 
hence T = 0), the creditor's best policy is to adopt a "tit for tat" rule by which the seizure 
rate is smaller than unity and linearly increases with the debtor's repudiation rate 
according to the debtor's effective leverage (D/A). In this case the optimal seizure rate 
also increases with the creditor's subjective probability of default, and decreases with the
creditor's degree of absolute risk aversion. It is important to note that the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions imply further that even in a "good" state of world in which the debtor country 
is expected to repay its debt fully (i.e., r = 0), it is still optimal for the creditor to exercise 
a positive seizure rate in order to compensate for the risk-bearing costs stemming from the 
a priori level of uncertainty about the state of world:
s* = (1 - p ) R cA • (15)
Obviously, when the collateral constraint is binding, the creditor's best policy is a total 
seizure of the debtor country's assets holding abroad.
The creditor's reservation price (Pc) of recycling the debtor country's debt can 
now be found by substituting the optimal seizure rate into Eq. 12 and dividing the 
resultant expected utility by the debt level. When the collateral constraint is not binding, 
the creditor's reservation price of recycling the debtor country's debt is
, . 0.5p
Pc ~ (1 - p)Rc D • (16)
In this case the creditor's reservation price incrases with the creditor's subjective 
probability of default, and decreases with the creditor's degree of absolute risk aversion. 
It is important to note further that in this case where the collateral constraint is not 
binding, the creditor enjoyes a powerful retaliatory edge over the debtor country and 
hence the creditor's reservation price is greater than unity.
However, it is more likely that the debtor country's foreign assets are significantly 
smaller than its external liabilities and hence the collateral constraint is binding. In this 
case, the creditor’s reservation price is found by substituting a unit seizure rate in the 
creditor's expected utility and dividing the resultant by D:
Pc = 1 - {r + 0.5RC (1 - p) [r2 - 2rA/D + (A/D)2]D - A/D}p. (17)
Note that since the effective leverage (A/D) is smaller than l+2r, the creditor's reservation 
price increases with the debtor country's effective leverage. Furthermore, in this case Pc 
decreases with the perceived repudiation rate (r) that would be implemented by the debtor 
country when a "bad" state of world is realized as long as
r - A/D < 1/RC (1 - p). (18)
That is, the likelihood that a rise in the perceived repudiation rate reduces the creditor's 
reservation price increases with the debtor country's effective leverage and the creditor's 
degree of absolute risk aversion, and declines with the creditor's subjective probability 
that the debtor country would default.
4. EQUILIBRIUM RATE OF REPUDIATION, THE SECONDARY 
MARKET PRICE AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis of the secondary market equilibrium is carried out under the
assumption that both debtor country and creditor have identical assessments of the
distribution of the states of nature (p). The analysis considers the most likely case in
which the debtor country's effective collateral (A) is very limited and thus leading the
creditor to set the seizure rate to be equal to one in the case of a default. It is assumed
further that this tentative and conditional seizure rate is signaled to the debtor country.
Under this assumption the debtor country's optimum condition (Eq. 7) for maximum
expected utility becomes
l - R d { [ K 5 v - ( l - r ) D ] ( l + p )  + [(K + A ) v - D ] ( l - p ) }  = 0. (19)
Consequendy, the debtor country sets the repudiation rate to be 
r* = 2 + l /R dD - [(1 + p)5v + (1 - p)v](K/D) - (1 - p)v (A/D) (2Q)
Eq. 20 indicates that the equilibrium rate of repudiation (r*) decreases with the debtor 
country's degree of absolute risk aversion, level of indebtedness, and domestic and 
foreign assets. As can be expected, r* declines with the ratio of the debtor country’s 
revenues under a "bad" state of world to those obtainable under a "good" state of world. 
However, the effect of the probability of a "bad" state of world on the equilibrium 
repudiation rate is not clear a-priori:
d r *  ■> <i
= 0 as r* |  [(1 - 6) K/D + A/D]v.
Furthermore, the greater the debtor country’s effective leverage the greater its equilibrium 
rate of repudiation. This can be easily shown by differentiating r* with respect to D/A:
d r* _ r 1 - p >
d(D/A) [I + p j (d/A)2 > 0. (21)
Finally, the substitution of r* into the creditor's reservation price equation (17) 
yields, in turn, the secondary market equilibrium price (P*) of the sovereign debt:
P* = 1 - {r* + 0.5Rc (l -p) [r*2 -2r*A/D + (A/D)2]D-A/D}p. (22)
Note that if inequality 18 holds, P* is inversely related to r* and hence the secondary 
equilibrium price of sovereign debt increases with the debtor country's levels of absolute 
risk aversion and domestic assets. Note further that the effect of the debtor country’s 
effective leverage on the secondary market price of its debt is not clear a-priori. By 
differentiating both sides of Eq. 22 with respect to D/A and reconsidering Eq. 21 it can be 
shown that
dP*
d(D/A) (D/A)2 >
as
> -1 r ap*
< D/A 1 + P)
= 0
(23)
BP*
Since—gr < 0, it can be concluded that for sufficiently small effective leverage’s values,
the secondary market price of the country’s external debt rises as the country’s effective 
leverage increases; whereas for sufficiently high values of effective leverage, the 
secondary market price of the country’s external debt declines as its effective leverage 
rises.
Furthermore, the greater the debtor country’s effective leverage the greater its equilibrium 
rate of repudiation. This can be easily shown by differentiating r* with respect to D/A:
d r* _ f 1 - p
d(D/A) I '1 + p I (D/A)2 > 0. (21)
Finally, the substitution of r* into the creditor's reservation price equation (17) 
yields, in turn, the secondary market equilibrium price (P*) of the sovereign debt:
P* = 1 - {r* + 0.5Rc (l -p) [r*2 - 2r*A/D + (A/D)2]D - A/D}p. (22)
Note that if inequality 18 holds, P* is inversely related to r* and hence the secondary 
equilibrium price of sovereign debt increases with the debtor country's levels of absolute 
risk aversion and domestic assets. Note further that the effect of the debtor country’s 
effective leverage on the secondary market price of its debt is not clear a-priori. By 
differentiating both sides of Eq. 22 with respect to D/A and reconsidering Eq. 21 it can be 
shown that
dP* _ __________________ ,________.
d(D/A) (D/A)2 = 0
as
> -1 3P* f \  - p \  v
p + Rc D(1 - p)pr* = i V j ,  © /A T  Rc° (1 '  P)P (23)
3P*Since ^  < 0, it can be concluded that for sufficiently small effective leverage’s values,
the secondary market price of the country’s external debt rises as the country’s effective 
leverage increases; whereas for sufficiently high values of effective leverage, the 
secondary market price of the country’s external debt declines as its effective leverage 
rises.
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